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PRO-NATALIST CASH TRANSFER POLICY AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY:
EVIDENCE FROM HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS IN KOREA
By
Jongeun Park
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impacts of pro-natal cash transfer on residential mobility with
household survey data in South Korea. With the subgroup analysis, the analysis shows some
groups migration decisions have been significantly affected by the cash transfer. It indicates
that there are positive impacts of the cash transfer on the probability to move for the households
with either the lower-income level or fewer than two children. In addition to the result of no
significant impact of the cash transfer on the migration decision for permanent workers, it
suggests no significant effect of the cash transfer for different age groups as well.
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PRO-NATALIST CASH TRANSFER POLICY AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY
1 INTRODUCTION
South Korea is facing a drastic decline in fertility level. Since the early 2000s, the total fer-
tility rate (TFR) has decreased, and the figure was recorded at 0.98 in 2018. Such low birth
rate trend causes many social and economic problems including an increase in a financial bur-
den and decrease in the number of potential workers (Cho, 2010), undermining the nations
competitiveness in the world economy (Mcdonald, 2008). In response, the central government
and municipal governments have tried to tackle the lower fertility rate and The 1st Basic Plan
for Low Fertility and Population Ageing was adopted in 2006. The basic plan includes the
pro-natal policy measures including an extended education service and expansion of childcare
facilities throughout the country. In addition to the national pro-natal policies, many municipal
governments started to provide the pro-natalist cash transfer (hereinafter referred to as cash
transfer), as one of the pro-natal policies in order to encourage people to have new birth (Bae,
2010; Kim, 2017)
Even though there exists a vast literature on the impact of cash transfer on fertility in South
Korea, the impact of cash transfer on residential mobility is little studied (Song & Kim, 2014;
Hong & Sullivan, 2016). According to Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine (2013), social pro-
tection has influenced a migration decision, playing a role as compensation for moving cost,
increasing productivity, higher income, and benefit conditionality. Also, higher cash transfer
would contribute to population inflows since people might consider cash transfer as either an
additional income or an indicator for good infrastructure for raising children (Song & Kim,
2014). Thus, this paper tries to scrutinize the effectiveness of the cash transfer on residen-
tial mobility using the cash transfer difference at the household level. It uses the fact that the
amount of the cash transfer varies across municipalities as each municipal governments deter-
mine the amount and the conditionality of their respective cash transfer policy.
The paper finds no significant overall effects of the cash transfer on residential mobility.
However, with the subgroup analysis, it turns out that the households who have either zero or
one child are more likely to be affected by the cash transfer. Especially for the families with
no child, the probability to move increases by around 83.2% when the cash transfer increases
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by 1 million KRW. Besides, if the households income belongs to the first quartile income
level, there are positive impacts of the cash transfer on their migration probability at 10%
significance level. In addition, while the investigation shows no significant impacts on the
migration decision for the permanent workers, there are negative impacts for non-permanent
workers though marginally significant. Also, it reveals no significant effects of the cash transfer
for different age groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the pro-natalist cash transfer
policy and related literature. Section 3 and 4 describe the data and empirical strategy used in
this study. While Section 5 gives the estimation results, Section 6 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Pro-natalist Cash Transfer Policy
In response to the long-lasting low fertility rate in Korea, the central government enacted the
1st Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Population Ageing in 2006. Since then, the government
has adopted a new plan every five years. Hoping that more people marry and have more kids,
the plans have included not only the policies relevant to population aging but various pro-natal
policies such as extended childcare and education services, and establishment of a relevant
medical system (Lee, 2009).
With the adoption of the basic plan by the central government in 2006, several municipal
governments started to enact pro-natal municipal laws or regulations to increase their local
population on their own. Among the main policies is the provision of a certain amount of cash
transfer to those who give birth. Accordingly, the cash transfer has rapidly spread nationwide.
As shown in Appendix Figure 1, as of 2016, 223 out of 229 municipalities implemented the
cash transfer policy.
Meanwhile, municipal governments have been given the autonomy to decide the amount
and the conditionality of their cash transfer. As a result, the payment amount and eligibility
condition of the benefits are different across the municipalities. Appendix Figure 2 represents
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how the number of municipalities that have adopted cash transfer has changed over time. It
also shows how benefit amount varies between municipalities. It can be seen that many munic-
ipalities have competitively introduced the cash transfer in the last ten years. Moreover, even
within the same municipality, the amount of cash transfer may differ depending on the birth
parity of a newborn; it is designed in such manner in order to encourage people to have many
more kids than just one. (Hur & Lee, 2011).
2.2 Literature Review
Many studies have been conducted to investigate the main factors of decreasing fertility rates
in South Korea. Among the factors that affect fertility decision are maternal age (Kim, 2007),
income (Butz & Ward, 1979), job security (Lee, 2009), age at marriage (Cho, 2010; Kim, 2005;
Lee, 2009), womens higher education attainment, and active labor force participation (Choi,
2008; Mincer, 1985). Moreover, the change in values and norms for marriage and career (Cho,
2010; D’Addio & D’Ercole, 2005; Lee, 2006) are also suggested as reasons for a decline in
fertility rates.
Furthermore, there is a vast literature on the effectiveness of cash transfer on childbearing in
South Korea. While some advocate that cash transfer policies have positive effects on fertility
behavior (Choi & Song, 2010; Hong, Kim, Lim, & Yeo, 2016; Hong & Sullivan, 2016; Hur
& Lee, 2011; Lee, Kim, & Kim, 2012; Lee, 2014; Kim, 2017), the other studies point out that
there are little benefits (Kim & Cheon, 2016; Suk, 2011).
Additionally, some researchers suggest that some people would move from a municipality
with a low cash transfer to another one with a higher cash transfer (Hong & Sullivan, 2016; Kim
& Lee, 2018; Song & Kim, 2014). This can be explained with the view that the welfare system
such as family support a form of indirect wage might affect migration decision (Kurekova,
2013). To be specific, Hong and Sullivan (2016) find that cash transfer leads to an increase of
female net inflow to the municipality with higher cash transfer in Korea, using difference-in-
differences methodology. However, the observation sample used in the study is limited to the
households with at least two children, and the treatment areas are limited to only three cities
and one county.
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In addition, Song and Kim (2014) suggest that a higher amount of cash transfer could
reflect an appropriate local environment for raising children, increasing the expected benefits
of internal migration. Then, they figure out that the cash transfer leads to more of young
womens internal immigration significantly. Also, Kim and Lee (2018) find that the cash transfer
increases the net inflow of women, though showing no significant impacts on fertility rate after
the womens immigration.
Meanwhile, similar studies investigating the effects of cash transfer on migration behavior
have been conducted in other contexts. Nakajima and Tanaka (2014) find that people are more
likely to migrate to municipalities where community-based support pro-natal policy is more
commonplace, using Japans 2004 Family Income and Expenditure Survey. Also, though it
is not a pro-natal cash transfer, Stecklov, Winters, Stampini, and Davis (2005) find that the
Mexican PROGRESA Program, which mainly consists of conditional cash transfers, reduces
migration into the United States and that the PROGRESS program does not affect domestic
migration significantly.
In addition, Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine (2013) suggest that the effects of social pro-
tection policy on migration decision can be different depending on the demographic and social
backgrounds such as gender and education level. Furthermore, Adhikari and Gentilini (2018)
review the literature studying the effects of cash transfer policy on migration and summarize
that cash transfer can affect the decision to migrate reducing liquidity constraints, though the
impact size level is quite moderate.
To sum, despite that there have been numerous studies to investigate the impacts of pro-
natal cash transfer on fertility, only few studies scrutinize how cash transfer policies affect
residential choices at micro-level (Hong & Sullivan, 2016; Kim & Lee, 2018; Song & Kim,
2014). Thus, this paper tries to fill the gap by investigating the impact of pro-natal cash transfer
on residential mobility at the household level with the cases of all municipality in South Korea.
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3 DATA
3.1 The Pro-natal Cash Transfer Policy
I use the Open Information System (OIS), which provides administrative information from mu-
nicipal governments, and, in particular, data on cash transfer. The data contains information on
the amount of cash transfer by birth parity, the conditionality of the cash transfer and the pay-
ment period since the year each municipal government started to implement the cash transfer
policy1.
Since the eligibility or payment method of cash transfer differ across municipalities, this
paper defines cash transfer as the policy measure that provides cash to women who gave (more)
birth, following the one defined by Lee et al. (2012)2. Besides, in this paper, the total amount
of benefits is the expected amount that families can receive for 5 years from the municipal
government if they give new birth, assuming that households will consider the total cash amount
they can receive for 5 years when they choose where to live, partly following the definition by
Lee (2014).
3.2 The Korea Housing Survey
Furthermore, I use the Korea Housing Survey (KHS), which is suited to the analysis of cash
transfer and residential mobility although the main purpose of the survey is to identify peo-
ples housing situation. The KHS provides a fruitful cross-sectional data not only on residential
mobility issues such as past and current residence at the municipal level3, but also household
characteristics such as socioeconomic status and demographic composition. I use 2008, 2010,
and 2016 waves of the KHS4 obtained from the Micro Data Integrated Service (MDIS), com-
1An alternative way to obtain the data is to utilize the Enhanced Local Laws and Regulations Information
System (ELIS), which provides the relevant laws and regulations that include the detailed information about the
cash transfer policy implemented by each local government. However, some local laws and regulations often do
not provide information on the specific amount of cash transfer, and there is some discrepancy between the laws
and actual transfer. Thus, I cannot use ELIS as the main dataset; instead, I double-checked the information from
ELIS to verify the data of OIS.
2Since February 2013, the central government enacted the childcare subsidy policy for those who have children,
regardless of their income or the number of children. This central subsidy is excluded from the childcare subsidy
because it is homogeneous across the municipality so that it does not affect the analysis result.
3The survey asks a) How long have you lived here and b) where did you live before move-in?
4I exclude the 2012 and 2014 waves since they do not contain residential information at the municipal level.
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prising a total of 229 municipalities with approximately 80 thousand households including
those who have internally migrated.
I mainly use the sample of households with married women of age between 20 and 49 to
examine the impacts on residential choice. In this study, a migration case within the same
municipality is excluded, and residential mobility is defined as the migration between two
different municipalities. In addition, for the main part of the analysis, I rely on the dependent
dummy variables constructed from the survey: MOV Ehij is equal to 1 if the household h
moves from the municipality i to municipality j. Furthermore, I focus on the differences in cash
transfer amounts between past and current municipalities (hereinafter called as cash transfer
difference), which can be regarded as an additional income. Moreover, for those who do not
move, cash transfer difference is recorded as zero.
Table 1 shows the descriptive summary statistics of the key variables. The full sample shows
all households in the KHS data, and the main sample denotes the households with married
women aged between 20 and 49 (excluding households whose past residence is missing). To be
specific, the probability of moving to another municipality is around 28% in the main sample.
The mean value of cash transfer difference is at around zero value for both full and main sample,
though the overall standard deviations have quite higher variation in the main sample than that
of the full sample.
As mentioned earlier, the amount of cash transfer could vary depending on the birth parity
of a newborn. In general, when the birth parity increases, the amount increases as well. On
average, for the first- and second-born child, the municipal governments provide around 0.18
million and 0.51 million KRW, respectively. It is noted that when the birth parity of a new
kid increases from second to third, the amount increases at around 1.1 million KRW. So, the
households who give birth their third and fourth child can obtain 1.61 and 1.90 million KRW,
on average.
Moreover, people who belong to the main sample have higher income, more children, and
a higher education level than the average. However, overall regional characteristics of the main
sample are quite similar to the full sample. The control variables used in the analysis are mainly
referred from Hong et al. (2016) and Song and Kim (2014).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (2008, 2010, 2016)
Full Main
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Probability of Moving 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45
The Amount of Cash Transfer Difference 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.61
The Amount of Cash Transfer by Birth Parity
First Child 0.18 0.53
Second Child 0.51 1.02
Third Child 1.61 2.64
Fourth Child 1.90 3.03
Basic Controls
Annual Income 29.06 24.56 41.38 22.48
Moving Distance 41.47 86.87 36.53 81.33
The Number of Existing Children 0.87 0.96 1.38 0.96
Education Attainment Level
- Primary Education and Less 0.21 0.41 0.02 0.13
- Lower Secondary Education 0.12 0.33 0.04 0.20
- Higher Secondary Education 0.34 0.47 0.39 0.49
- Tertiary Education and Over 0.33 0.47 0.56 0.50
Female's Age 51.83 15.20 39.00 6.32
Proportion of Permanent Job (%) 0.38 0.48 0.64 0.48
Further Controls
Proportion of Women of Childbearing Age (%) 52.87 6.59 54.18 5.95
Crude Divorce Rate (per 1,000 population) 2.33 0.42 2.36 0.41
Crude Marriage Rate (per 1,000 population) 6.22 1.18 6.38 1.16
Social Welfare Expenditure (%) 30.82 13.84 30.22 13.11
Number of Childcare Facilities (per 1,000 kids) 15.15 3.99 14.99 3.84
Number of Elementary Schools 34.99 20.49 35.99 20.01
Number of Kindergartens 53.98 34.29 56.19 33.74
Financial Independence (%) 34.56 16.78 36.93 16.95
Local Tax per Capita 3.07 2.53 3.09 2.62
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the full and the main sample. While the full sample
consists of all households, the main sample refers to the households with married female aged from 20 to
49. The observations for the full and main sample are respectively 80,878 and 30,918 households. The
basic- and further controls are at the individual and municipal level, respectively. The units of the amount
of cash transfer difference, which is calculated by the gap between the past residences- and the current
residences pro-natal cash transfer amount, annual income and local tax per capita are million KRW,
unless otherwise specified. The unit of moving distance, which is the distance between the past and the
current residence, is kilometer. Social welfare expenditure is the ratio of social welfare expenditure to
the total expenditure. Financial independence is the proportion of local tax- and non-tax revenue to the
total budget.
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4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To estimate the effects of cash transfer on residential mobility, I use the cash transfer difference,
which is the difference of the cash transfer amount between the past and the current munici-
palities, as a key independent variable. Using the sample of 2008, 2010, 2016 Korea Housing
Survey, the baseline estimating equation is as the following:
Movehij = α + βCashTransferDifferencehij + γXhj + θj + φy + hij (1)
where Movehij is equal to 1 if household h moves from municipality i to municipality j,
and 0 otherwise; CashTransferDifferencehij is the difference between the cash transfer
amount of municipality i and j ; Xhj denotes a vector of control variables in municipality j; θj
and φy describe the controls for municipality j - and year y fixed effects, respectively; and hij
is an error term.
The main regressor of interest, CashTransferDifferencehij , reflects the extent to which
a household can obtain additional income through internal migration from one municipality to
the other. The idea of cash transfer difference is partially derived from Song and Kim (2014)
who use the ratio of cash transfer amount at a destination to an origin municipality at the
regional level. Also, equation (1) also controls for municipal and year fixed effects, which
capture unobserved municipal characteristics that do not vary over time and omitted variables
that change over time but are the same across municipalities, respectively.
In the meantime, newly married couples, who do not provide any information of the past
residence, are excluded in the analysis since it is not possible to calculate cash transfer dif-
ference, even though there is some possibility that they consider potential cash transfer when
they choose where to live. This would lead to underestimation of the effects of the cash trans-
fer. Also, the analysis does not examine the behavior after migration such as how long people
stay after migration or whether they give birth, due to data unavailability. This may under- or
overestimate the impacts of the cash transfer.
In short, the results of equation (1) will show the effectiveness of the cash transfer on
residential mobility at the household level. Additionally, the paper will scrutinize the effects
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in detail with heterogeneous group analysis: the number of existing children, annual income,
employment type, and female's age. Accordingly, what particular household groups would be
more affected by the cash transfer when they choose the future residence will be presented.
5 ESTIMATION RESULTS
The OLS estimation results of equation (1) are shown in Table 2. In column (1), the coefficient
of the cash transfer difference reports -0.009 but insignificant. After controlling the basic and
the further controls and the municipality fixed effects, column (4) shows that there is no signif-
icant relationship between cash transfer difference and the residential choice, though the value
is -0.008. In addition, Table 2 describes that as the number of existing children and the age
of mother increase, the possibility of moving decreases by 1.3% and 1.7%, respectively, at the
1 percent level of significance. Also, the results show that other factors including educational
attainment, annual income and moving distance show no significant impacts on migration de-
cision.
While the results of Table 2 represent the overall effects, it is also available to find how
particular groups are affected the most by higher cash transfer, considering the heterogeneous
characteristics such as the number of existing children, an annual income level, and job employ-
ment status. The different effects would be shown depending on the households socioeconomic
background (Hagen-Zanker & Himmelstine, 2013). To begin with, Table 3 represents the es-
timate of cash transfer on the probability of residential mobility by the number of existing
children.
Column (1) through (4) in Table 3 show that the cash transfer difference has positive effects
for the households who have less than two children, especially for the families without any
child. To be specific, the coefficient in column (1) reports 0.297, which implies that if the
households were able to obtain additional 1 million KRW after they move and give birth, the
possibility of migration increases by 29.7 percentage point. Also, given that the mean value of
the probability of migration for the households with no child is 0.357, such figure implies an
increase by about 83.2 percent, which is a huge magnitude.
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Table 2: The Effects of the Cash Transfer Difference on Residential Mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES No Child One Child
Two
Children
Over Three
Children
Cash Transfer Difference -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
The Number of Existing Children -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female's Age -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education Attainment
Lower Secondary Education 0.002 -0.004 -0.004
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Upper Secondary Education 0.006 -0.010 -0.014
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Tertiary Education and Over 0.031* 0.012 0.005
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Annual Income 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Permanent Job 0.007 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Distance 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.304*** 0.937*** 0.711*** 0.371
(0.004) (0.025) (0.041) (0.236)
Observations 30,901 30,451 30,145 30,145
R-squared 0.004 0.072 0.079 0.101
Basic Controls NO YES YES YES
Further Controls NO NO YES YES
Regional FE NO NO NO YES
Notes: This table reports the impact of the cash transfer on the probability to move. The dependent
variables are dummy variables for whether the households move or not. Basic controls include: Number
of existing children, household heads education attainment level, annual income (million KRW),
whether head of the household has a permanent job or not, moving distance (kilometer), and female's
age. Further controls include: Proportion of women of childbearing age (%), crude divorce rate (per
10,000 population), crude marriage rate (per 10,000 population), social welfare expenditure (%), the
number of childcare facilities, the number of elementary schools, the number of kindergartens, financial
independence (%) and local tax per capita (in million KRW). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The regression also controls year fixed effects as well as regional fixed effects.
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Considering that the average amount of the cash transfer for the firstborn is around 0.18
million KRW, the municipality offering an additional 1 million KRW cash transfer would be
regarded as a place where the leadership has a relatively higher willingness to provide additional
pro-natal supports for child-caring other than the provision of the cash transfer.
Consequently, the households with no child are more likely to be attracted to that munic-
ipality, thinking that the municipality where they could obtain cash transfer five times higher
than the average would be an appropriate place to raise their future child. By the same logic, I
could support the idea of Song and Kim (2014) that the higher amount of cash transfer indicates
the better environment for child caring to some extent.
In the meantime, the coefficient in column (2) represents 0.062, which also shows that
higher cash transfer leads to higher migration probability at about 6.2 percentage point or 20.7
percent, though the magnitude of the effect is lower than that in column (1). In contrast, the
analysis shows no significant effects on the possibility for households who have more than two
children. The results are shown in column (3) through (4).
Briefly, it turns out that the household group with no child are more likely to respond to
additional cash transfer, while there are insignificant effects on the migration decision for the
families with many children. One possible explanation is that people who have many children
would have considered additional factors affecting their childrens education such as transferring
to another school when they decide where to live. In that viewpoint, people who have no child
are relatively free to choose a place of residence, which allows them to be more influenced by
the cash transfer than the other groups.
Furthermore, as argued by Adhikari and Gentilini (2018), cash transfer would be consid-
ered as an additional income alleviating the financial constraints. Table 4 shows the effects of
cash transfer difference by annual income, which is separated into four quartiles. Column (1)
reports the coefficient of 0.029 for the households that belong to the first quartile of annual
income among the whole households, showing that higher cash transfer is associated with a 9.5
percent higher probability of migration at 10 percent significance level. In contrasts, Column
(2) through (4) show that there are negative relationships between the cash transfer and the
probability to move for the other income level households, though the coefficients, other than
11
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Table 3: The Effects of the Cash Transfer Difference on Residential Mobility by the Number
of Existing Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES No Child One Child
Two
Children
Over Three
Children
Cash Transfer Difference 0.297*** 0.062** -0.002 -0.015
(0.094) (0.031) (0.005) (0.010)
Female's Age -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Education Attainment
Lower Secondary Education -0.017 -0.013 0.065* -0.177**
(0.050) (0.048) (0.033) (0.069)
Upper Secondary Education 0.030 0.008 0.010 -0.089
(0.044) (0.042) (0.029) (0.061)
Tertiary Education and Over 0.049 0.037 0.024 -0.062
(0.044) (0.042) (0.029) (0.062)
Annual Income -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Permanent Job 0.005 -0.008 0.010 0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.019)
Distance 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.481 0.571 -0.342 2.027**
(0.394) (0.558) (0.396) (0.924)
Observations 7,303 6,794 13,533 2,322
R-squared 0.287 0.104 0.086 0.155
Basic Controls YES YES YES YES
Further Controls YES YES YES YES
Regional FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: This table reports the impact of the cash transfer on the probability of migration by the number
of existing children. The dependent variables are dummy variables for whether the households move
or not. Basic controls include: Household heads education attainment level, Annual income (million
KRW), whether head of the household has a permanent job or not, moving distance (kilometer), and
female's age. Further controls include: Proportion of women of childbearing age (%), crude divorce
rate (per 10,000 population), crude marriage rate (per 10,000 population), social welfare expenditure
(%), the number of childcare facilities, the number of elementary schools, the number of kindergartens,
financial independence (%) and local tax per capita (in million KRW). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. The regression also controls year fixed effects as well as regional fixed effects.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
* Significant at 10 percent level.
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Table 4: The Effects of the Cash Transfer Difference on Residential Mobility by the Annual
Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
First
Quartile
Second
Quartile
Third
Quartile
Fourth
Quartile
Cash Transfer Difference 0.029* -0.015 -0.025* -0.010
(0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.009)
The Number of Existing Children -0.050*** -0.028*** -0.004 0.022***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Female's Age -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education Attainment
Lower Secondary Education -0.028 0.021 -0.011 0.086
(0.027) (0.056) (0.051) (0.053)
Upper Secondary Education -0.001 -0.040 -0.056 0.100**
(0.025) (0.048) (0.044) (0.044)
Tertiary Education and Over 0.008 -0.004 -0.020 0.115***
(0.027) (0.049) (0.044) (0.044)
Annual Income -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Permanent Job 0.016 -0.004 -0.004 0.017*
(0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009)
Distance 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.795 -0.560 0.952** 0.306
(0.602) (0.701) (0.440) (0.408)
Observations 6,920 4,802 8,259 10,164
R-squared 0.162 0.148 0.124 0.099
Basic Controls YES YES YES YES
Further Controls YES YES YES YES
Regional FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: This table displays the effectiveness of the cash transfer on the probability of moving by annual
income. The dependent variables are dummy variables for whether the households move or not.
Basic controls include: The number of existing children, household heads education attainment level,
whether head of the household has a permanent job or not, moving distance (kilometer), and female's
age. Further controls include: Proportion of women of childbearing age (%), crude divorce rate (per
10,000 population), crude marriage rate (per 10,000 population), social welfare expenditure (%), the
number of childcare facilities, the number of elementary schools, the number of kindergartens, financial
independence (%) and local tax per capita (in million KRW). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The regression also controls year fixed effects as well as regional fixed effects.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
* Significant at 10 percent level.
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that of column (3), are insignificant.
To sum up, considering the role of cash transfer as an auxiliary income, a lower-income
family might be more likely to be affected by the cash transfer, which reduces the financial
constraints. This result could lead to the suggestion to the municipal governments who want
to attract people using the cash transfer that it would be more effective to focus on the lowest
25% income households rather than the other income level groups.
In addition, it is possible that the migration responses to the cash transfer are different
depending on the employment type: whether the households have a permanent job or not.
Column (1) in Table 5 represents that there are no significant impacts of the cash transfer on
the probability of moving for the family whose head has a permanent job. In contrasts, among
the households whose jobs are non-permanent, there is a negative relationship between the cash
transfer and the migration decision at 10% significance level. Admittedly, it is hard to see it
as meaningful due to the marginally significant coefficient. However, one possible factor of
this negative relationship can be explained by the conditionality of the cash transfer. Given that
larger amounts of the cash transfer generally tend to require longer period of staying period,
if job instability made people favor short-term residence when determining the next residence,
due to the uncertainty of future employment, the strict conditionality with regards to minimum
staying period would allow non-permanent worker to avoid migrating to other municipalities
with higher cash transfer.
Furthermore, since the coefficients in Table 2 represents the negative relationship between
the probability to move and the female's age, it is available to see whether the migration re-
sponses to the cash transfer are different depending on the female's age or not. The analysis
provides no significant effects on the probability of moving when the groups are separated by
female's age: 20s, 30s, 40s and over 50. The results are presented in Table 6.
To summarize, with the subgroup analysis, this paper discovers that the impacts of the
cash transfer on residential mobility are different depending on the number of children and
annual income. If municipal governments want to make use of the cash transfer as a tool for
attracting more people, they should consider which specific groups are more affected by the
cash transfer. In general, the amount of cash transfer has been differed especially depending on
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Table 5: The Effects of the Cash Transfer Difference on Residential Mobility by the Employ-
ment Type
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Permanent Job Non-permanent Job
Cash Transfer Difference 0.001 -0.020*
(0.009) (0.011)
Constant 0.103 0.701*
(0.300) (0.398)
Observations 19,402 10,743
R-squared 0.112 0.093
Basic Controls YES YES
Further Controls YES YES
Regional FE YES YES
Notes: This table reports the impact of the cash transfer on the probability to move by employment type.
The dependent variables are dummy variables for whether the households move or not. Basic controls
include: The number of existing children, household heads education attainment level, annual income
(million KRW), moving distance (kilometer), and female's age. Further controls include: Proportion of
women of childbearing age (%), crude divorce rate (per 10,000 population), crude marriage rate (per
10,000 population), social welfare expenditure (%), the number of childcare facilities, the number of
elementary schools, the number of kindergartens, financial independence (%) and local tax per capita
(in million KRW). Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regression also controls year fixed effects
as well as regional fixed effects.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
* Significant at 10 percent level.
the birth parity of a newborn across the municipalities: the higher the birth parity, the higher
the amount of cash transfer. Instead, it would be better if they provided higher amount of cash
transfer to specific households: those who have either relatively lower-income or few children.
In addition, for the households whose jobs are non-permanent, the conditionality in conjunction
with staying period might become an obstacle when deciding where to live. With regard to the
effect of cash transfer for different age groups, this paper fails to find statistically significant
effects.
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Table 6: The Effects of the Cash Transfer Difference on Residential Mobility by the Female's
Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 20 - 29 30 - 39 40 - 49 Over 50
Cash Transfer Difference -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.001
(0.050) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Constant -1.824 -0.357 -0.177 -0.478***
(1.317) (0.382) (0.302) (0.182)
Observations 2,330 13,200 14,615 26,361
R-squared 0.172 0.066 0.037 0.056
Basic Controls YES YES YES YES
Further Controls YES YES YES YES
Regional FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: This table reports the impact of the cash transfer on the probability to move by female's age
group. Column (4) uses the full sample instead of the main sample. The dependent variables are
dummy variables for whether the households move or not. Basic controls include: The number of
existing children, household heads education attainment level, annual income (million KRW), whether
head of the household has a permanent job or not, moving distance (kilometer), and female's age.
Further controls include: Proportion of women of childbearing age (%), crude divorce rate (per 10,000
population), crude marriage rate (per 10,000 population), social welfare expenditure (%), the number
of childcare facilities, the number of elementary schools, the number of kindergartens, financial
independence (%) and local tax per capita (in million KRW). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The regression also controls year fixed effects as well as regional fixed effects.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
* Significant at 10 percent level.
6 CONCLUSION
To deal with rapid fertility rates decline in South Korea, not only the central government but
also municipal governments have tried to solve this problem with various pro-natal policies
including the cash transfer. The cash transfer might play a role as an additional income for
households, and people would respond to this cash transfer when they decide where to live.
Thus, this paper investigates the effects of cash transfer on residential mobility at the household
level.
According to the results, while there is no significant overall impact of cash transfer dif-
ference on the probability to move, the cash transfer has been shown to be effective for some
heterogeneous groups. First, the families having less than two children are more likely to be
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affected by the cash transfer. Also, when households incomes belong to the least 25% income
level, there are positive impacts of the cash transfer on their probability to move. Thus, it turns
out that the households who either have fewer children or belong to lower-income level are
more likely to be affected by the cash transfer when they choose where to move.
Furthermore, the analysis indicates that those who have non-permanent jobs are less likely
to move when they could receive a higher amount of cash transfer. The paper suggests the
possibility that the conditionality of the cash transfer might play a role as an obstacle due to
their employment uncertainty. Moreover, it turns out that there are no significant impacts of the
cash transfer for various age groups of females.
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Figure 1: The Number of Municipalities with the Cash Transfer Policy
Notes: This graph represents the annual trends of the number of the municipalities which have adopted
the cash transfer policy.
Source: Author, with data from Open Information System.
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Figure 2: The Amount Change of the Pro-natal Cash Transfer
Notes: This graph reports how the cash transfer policy spreads out nationwide over the period. The unit
of the amount is million KRW, weighted by birth composition (real price as of 2015 KRW).
Source: Author, with data from Open Information System.
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